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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Hector Navarro appeals from the order dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 1 
In 2007, the state charged Navarro with lewd conduct with a child under 
sixteen for having intercourse with his thirteen-year-old cousin, M.M., "on or 
between the 1st day of May, 1995, and the 31 st day of August, 1995."2 (#34865 
R., pp.55-56; PSI, p.2.) Navarro lived with M.M. and her family "from May 1995 
to August 1995" and M.M. said, during that time, Navarro "tried to have sex with 
[her] approximately five times, but he was not successful each time because 
[she] would push him off her." (PSI, p.2.) M.M. reported the offense after 
learning she was pregnant. (PSI, p.2.) DNA tests indicated a 99.9 percent 
chance that Navarro was the father of M.M.'s child. (#34865 Tr., p.14, Ls.7-9; 
PSI, p.2.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Navarro pied guilty to the lewd conduct 
charge and the state agreed to recommend Navarro's sentence "run concurrent 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has entered an order taking judicial notice of the 
"Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 34865, STATE V. 
NAVARRO." (Order Re: Judicial Notice, dated July 2, 2013.) 
2 The state originally charged Navarro on February 14, 1996, and a warrant was 
issued that same day. (#34865 R., p.23.) The delay in adjudicating the charge 
appears to be due to the fact that Navarro was no longer in Idaho in 1996; 
however, he was eventually extradited from a Texas prison in May 2007 and 
returned to Idaho pursuant to a new warrant issued July 11, 2006. (PSI, p.2; see 
Tr., p.38, Ls.3-21; #34865 R., pp.31-34, 37.) · 
1 
with the sentence that he's currently serving in Texas" but otherwise "stand silent 
at sentencing." (#34865 Tr., p.4, Ls.22-25, p.16, Ls.19-21.) The court imposed 
a unified 25-year sentence with 12 ½ years fixed and ordered that it run 
concurrent with Navarro's Texas sentence. 3 (#34865 R., pp.80-81.) Navarro 
filed a Rule 35 motion, which the court denied. (#34865 R., pp.82-85.) Navarro 
appealed his sentence and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. 
Navarro, Docket No. 34865, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 543 (Ct. App. 
7/23/09). 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
While his direct appeal was pending, Navarro filed a petition for post-
conviction relief, claiming he pied guilty under the "misadvice [sic] of counsel." 
(R., p.4.) Navarro alleged his conviction was based on his "inadmissible coerced 
confession and/or the alleged victim's uncorroberated [sic] & false testimony" 
and that the "state failed to present physical evidence linking [him] directly to the 
alleged offense." (R., p.4.) Navarro also filed a supporting memorandum in 
which he asserted counsel was ineffective for failing to files motions to (1) recuse 
the judge; (2) dismiss "based on insufficient factual basis/insufficient evidence to 
substantiate a conviction" or based on a "defective Indictment"; (3) suppress; and 
(4) depose the victim, which would have allegedly revealed she "had previously 
made similar false accusations" against Jose Bueno. (R., pp.7-8.) Navarro 
3 In 2006, Navarro was sentenced to five years in prison for aggravated assault 
with a deadly weapon after he "took his wife to the woods and held a knife to her 
throat until she confessed she was having an affair." (PSI, pp.4-5) 
2 
further alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to "invoke the statute of 
limitations retroactively" and in representing him at sentencing. (R., pp.7, 14.) 
Finally, Navarro asserted (1) the court committed "plain-error" by failing to 
"conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing to determine 'if' [his] confession was in fact 
given freely & intelligently" and by "adjudicating" his case despite an allegedly 
"defective indictment" and expired statute of limitation; and (2) that he was being 
subjected to "cruel and unusual punishment." (R., p.8, 13-14 (capitalization 
altered, brackets original).) 
The state filed an answer, a motion requesting judicial notice of the 
"records, exhibits, and/or transcripts" in Navarro's underlying criminal case, and a 
motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.16-18, 28-45.) At the hearing on the 
state's motion for summary dismissal, the court appointed counsel to represent 
Navarro and continued the matter. (R., pp.49-50, 53-54.) Several months later, 
Navarro filed a response to the state's motion in which he requested summary 
dismissal in his favor and asserted: 
It was not until well after [his] conviction that he learned that 
the victim in the case had previously accused her father, Jose 
Bueno, of the same offense in Case Number 1996-67 42-C on 
August 20, 1996. That case was subsequently dismissed on 
August 29, 1996. Mr. Navarro contends that the State did not 
disclose in its discovery that the victim had accused another 
person, nor did his attorney learn of this accusation through any 
attempts to investigate the victim. Mr. Navarro has no knowledge if 
Mr. Bueno ever underwent D.N.A testing. 
Mr. Navarro also learned after his conviction that the victim 
in the case had made disclosures to Melodia Eloy Reyes that "she 
lied about Mr. Navarro raping her because she was pregnant and 
scared of her father, [and] that Mr. Navarro never touched her 
inappropriately. 
3 
(R., pp.69-70 (second brackets original).) 
In the "Argument" section of his response, Navarro asserted an entirely 
new "claim"4 - a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on the 
state's failure to disclose "that the victim in the case had accused her father of 
the offense" - and reframed his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
depose the victim into a "claim" that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct 
a complete investigation that would have allegedly uncovered the prior 
accusation, which information would have changed Navarro's decision to plead 
guilty. (R., pp.70-71.) At a subsequent hearing, Navarro withdrew the claims 
alleged in his petition and supporting memorandum5 and indicated his intent to 
pursue only the claims asserted in his motion for summary dismissal; the state 
did not object and the court scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., p.14, L.22-p.16, L.18; R. pp.79-80.) 
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court took judicial notice of 
"the underlying criminal file in 1996-1380C and its contents ... , the change of 
plea and sentencing transcripts," and "portions of the file in State versus Jose 
4 Post-conviction claims are supposed to be alleged in the petition, not in 
supporting memorandums, responsive pleadings or motions for summary 
disposition. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) ("Idaho 
Code section 19-4903 mandates that the application for post-conviction relief 
'specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based . . .. All 
grounds for relief ... must be raised in [the defendant's] original, supplemental, 
or amended application.' I.C. § 19-4908.") Nevertheless, the parties can 
expressly or impliedly consent to try a claim not alleged in the petition. Monahan 
v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008). 
5 Indeed, Navarro could not legitimately pursue any claim based on an 
involuntary confession because, although he pied guilty, he did not confess to 
law enforcement. (See Tr., p.44, L.8 - p.46, L.8.) 
4 
Maria Bueno 96-6742 from Canyon County."6 (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-16.) Following 
the evidentiary hearing, the court entered an Order Denying Post-Conviction 
Relief from which Navarro filed a timely notice of appeal.7 (R., pp.100-104.) 
6 The "portions of the file in State versus Jose Maria Bueno 96-67 42 from 
Canyon County" are not included in the record on appeal. 
7 As of the filing of this brief, it does not appear the district court has entered a 
final judgment as required by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a) and 58(a); 
therefore, this Court may wish to temporarily remand the case and suspend the 
appeal to allow for the entry of a final judgment. 
5 
ISSUES 
Navarro states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Navarro's petition for 
post-conviction relief because he established that the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose the case against the cousin's 
father violated due process? 
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Navarro's petition for 
post-conviction relief because he established that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Navarro failed to show the district court erred in denying relief on his 
Brady claim and his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
independently discover the evidence he claims was withheld by the state in 
violation of Brady? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
Navarro Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of Post-
Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Navarro contends the district court erred in denying relief on both his 
Brady claim and his related ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Appellant' 
Brief, pp.5-11.) Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
presented show Navarro failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to 
relief on either claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 
141 (1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of 
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 
964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. 
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
C. Navarro Has Failed To Show He Met His Burden Of Establishing A Brady 
Violation 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
7 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the legal standards applicable to 
an alleged Brady violation as follows: 
Due process requires all material exculpatory evidence 
known to the State or in its possession be disclosed to the 
defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 
794, 797 (2000). "[T]here is 'no constitutional requirement that the 
prosecutor make a complete and detailed accounting to defense of 
all police investigatory work on a case."' State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 
192, 195, 610 P.2d 551, 554 (1980) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 
U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972)). 
"There are three essential components of a true Brady violation: 
the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully 
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 144 L.Ed.2d 
286, 291 (1999). Impeachment evidence should be viewed in the 
same manner as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 
(1985); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3d 742, 745 
(2000). However, the United States Constitution does not require 
the State to disclose material impeachment information prior to 
entering a plea agreement with the defendant. United States v. 
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153 
L.Ed.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002). One of the reasons behind the 
Court's holding is that "impeachment information is special in 
relation to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is 
voluntary[.]" Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. at 2455, 153 L.Ed.2d 
at 595. 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004). 
Because Navarro pied guilty, he may only pursue a Brady claim if the 
evidence he contends was withheld wa? exculpatory rather than impeaching 
since the state had no obligation to disclose impeachment information prior to 
Navarro's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629; Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d 
8 
at 390. Thus, to the extent Navarro's argument relies on any impeachment value 
the evidence may have had, his claim fails. (Appellant's Brief, p.6 ("In addition to 
the impeaching nature of this evidence .... "), p.8 ("In light of the ... evidentiary 
significance of the withheld evidence both as impeachment and exculpatory 
evidence, .... ).) Even if Navarro contends the evidence was exculpatory, his 
claim still fails. 
"Exculpatory evidence has been defined as evidence which tends to clear 
an accused of alleged guilt, excuses the actions of the accused, or tends to 
reduce punishment." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 370, 941 P.2d 337, 342 
(Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411,816 P.2d 364,367 
(Ct. App. 1991 )). The evidence Navarro presented at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing regarding the prior charge against Bueno does not satisfy 
this definition. 
Navarro testified that Jose Bueno, who is his uncle and M.M.'s father, was 
also charged with lewd conduct in relation to M.M. "during the same time period" 
in "Case Number 1996-6742." (Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.15.) The prosecutor 
who handled Navarro's criminal case testified she was unaware of the charges 
against Bueno when she was handling Navarro's case but stated her 
understanding that "it's the same victim" and the time period alleged in Buena's 
case was a "continuing course of conduct between 1989 and 1996." (Tr., p.52, 
L.22 - p.53, L.25.) The prosecutor also testified it was her "understanding" the 
9 
case against Bueno was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.8 (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-
6.) 
The mere fact that Bueno was also charged with committing lewd conduct 
against M.M. in 1996 does not alone "tend[] to clear" Navarro of guilt, excuse his 
actions, or reduce his punishment, especially since the case against Bueno was 
dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage, nine days after it was filed. 9 
Osborne, 130 Idaho at 370, 941 P.2d at 342. Navarro presented no evidence 
establishing the basis for the charge against Bueno, why it was dismissed, or 
how the filing of the case against Bueno exculpates him in any way. Instead, 
Navarro contends the "accusation" against Bueno "weakens both pieces of the 
state's evidence," presumably referring to M.M.'s allegations and the paternity 
test. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) According to Navarro, "as the young cousin who 
8 The prosecutor who requested dismissal of Buena's case was a different 
prosecutor than the one assigned to Navarro's case and who testified at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (See Tr., p.54, Ls.11-13.) 
9 As previously noted, although the district court took judicial notice of "portions 
of the file in State versus Jose Maria Bueno 96-6742 from Canyon County" (Tr., 
p.21, L.15 - p.22, L.6), those documents are not included in the record on 
appeal. The only document from Buena's case that is included in the record is 
the Order Appointing the Public Defender, which was admitted as Exhibit 1 at the 
evidentiary hearing, and has been augmented to the record pursuant to 
Navarro's motion. In any event, the Idaho Repository shows that the state filed a 
lewd conduct charge against Bueno on August 20, 1996, and the charge was 
dismissed on August 29, 1996. For the Court's convenience, the case 
information from the Idaho Repository is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
10 
had moved out of state," he "was a far safer target on whom to pin the 
pregnancy than the father" and "the possibility that [his] uncle [Bueno] fathered 
the child places significant doubt on the DNA's conclusion of 99.9% probability of 
paternity." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Both of Navarro's arguments are flawed. 
To the extent, if any, the evidence tends to show M.M.'s motive to "pin the 
pregnancy" on anyone in her family, the evidence is merely impeaching. More 
importantly, Navarro's assertion makes no sense given that Navarro was 
charged by Criminal Complaint on February 14, 1996 (#34865 R., pp.5-6), and 
Bueno was not charged until six months later on August 20, 1996 (Appendix A). 
If M.M. had, as Navarro suggests, simply decided to "pin the pregnancy" on the 
"safer target," there would be no reason for her to subsequently implicate her 
father. Notably, Navarro failed to call M.M. or any other witness in order to 
establish the theory he advances, thereby failing to provide any evidence to 
support his allegations. 
Although Navarro filed an affidavit from Melodia Reyes in support of his 
petition in which Reyes claims M.M. told him in 2003 that "she had lied about Mr. 
Navarro raping her because she was pregnant and scared of her father" and that 
Navarro "never touched her inappropriately," this affidavit is hearsay and was not 
admitted as evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 10 See Loveland v. State, 141 
Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Unless introduced into 
evidence, pleadings are not evidence."). Moreover, it does not implicate Bueno 
10 Reyes' affidavit was not included in the Clerk's Record. Contemporaneous 
with this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment the record with the 
affidavit. 
11 
as an offender; it merely alleges M.M. said she was "scared of her father," which 
is not an unexpected emotion from a pregnant teenager. This is consistent with 
information from the underlying criminal file, which the court took judicial notice 
of at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the PSI materials 
include the report prepared by the investigating officer in 1995 at which time 
M.M. told the detective she had not told her father at the time of the offense 
because her "father gets violent (not towards her or her mother) and she was 
afraid of what he might do." (Canyon County Sheriff's Office Case Report, p.1 
(attached to PSI).) The most reasonable interpretation of this is that M.M. 
delayed disclosure because she was protecting Navarro from her father. 
The PSI also includes a report from July 11, 2006, when law enforcement 
reinitiated contact with M.M. "to see if she was interested in continuing the case" 
as it was still pending and "was coming up on the court calendar for dismissal. 
(Report of Officer M. Tucker, p.1 (attached to PSI).) M.M. told the officer "she 
was still interested in wanting the case pursued" after which law enforcement 
was able to locate Navarro and serve him with an arrest warrant and arrange his 
extradition to Idaho. (Id. at pp.1-2; see #34865 R., pp.27-37.) 
Thus, contrary to Reyes' hearsay affidavit that was never offered as 
evidence, the information the court took judicial notice of demonstrates M.M. 
maintained from 1995, when she first reported the lewd conduct, to 2006 when 
Navarro was extradited to Idaho to answer to the charge, that Navarro was the 
perpetrator. Navarro failed to present any evidence that the charges filed 
12 
against Bueno in 1996 and dismissed nine days later were in any way 
exculpatory. 
As for Navarro's argument that "the possibility that [his] uncle [Bueno] 
fathered the child places significant doubt on the DNA's conclusion of 99.9% 
probability of paternity" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), Navarro failed to present any 
evidence to support that theory either. The lab report, which was admitted as 
evidence, states: "The alleged father, HECTOR NAVARRO JR, cannot be 
excluded as the biological father of the child, ... , since they share genetic 
markers. Using the above systems, the probability of paternity is 99.99%, as 
compared to an untested, unrelated man of the Hispanic population." (Exhibit 2 
(Augmentation).) However, Navarro presented no DNA evidence from Bueno 
and no scientific testimony to support the proposition that Bueno would have the 
same or greater probability of paternity because he is related to Navarro or that 
the probability of Navarro's own paternity would have changed. Navarro instead 
claims the mere fact that Bueno is related is sufficient to "place[ ] significant 
doubt" on the 99.99% probability determination that Navarro fathered M.M.'s 
child. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) This argument is not supported by any actual 
evidence. It was Navarro's burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence each element of his Brady claim. Navarro does not meet that burden 
by positing speculative theories about what M.M. may have done or what some 
unknown DNA testing might show. 
In addition to his failure to show the case filed against Bueno was 
exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed, Navarro also failed to 
13 
prove the prejudice prong of his Brady claim. To show prejudice, Navarro was 
required to establish the fact that Bueno was charged with lewd conduct 
involving M.M. six months after Navarro was charged was "material" to his case 
and, more precisely, his decision to plead guilty. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282 
(the prejudice component of a Brady claim must satisfy the "materiality" inquiry). 
"[E]vidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citation and quotation 
omitted). "On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i.e., 
prejudice) is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's 
failure to produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the 
plea, but instead would have insisted on going to trial." Roeder v. State, 144 
Idaho 415, 418, 162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 
Idaho 428, 436, 855 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Ct. App. 1994)). This Court "employ[s] an 
objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld 
information, as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have 
insisted on going to trial." ~ at 418-19, 162 P.3d at 797-98. As part of this 
assessment, the Court will "evaluate whether a reasonable defendant ... , after 
obtaining the withheld information, would be convinced that an acquittal (or a 
conviction for a lesser offense) was a realistic possibility which ought not to be 
foreclosed by a guilty plea." ~ at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. The Court does not, 
however, "take into account" a defendant's subjective statements about the 
likelihood of not pleading guilty if the undisclosed information had been available. 
14 
Js.t The district court correctly concluded Navarro failed to show the Bueno case 
was material. (Tr., p.94, Ls.19-20.) 
Navarro presented no evidence to support the conclusion that there is a 
reasonable possibility that a defendant in Navarro's position who knew that a 
lewd conduct charge involving the same victim was filed against another person 
six months after the defendant was charged, but was dismissed for unknown 
reasons, would be convinced that the mere fact of that dismissed charge would 
have resulted in an acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense. M.M. 
maintained that Navarro "raped" her and attempted to have inappropriate sexual 
contact with her on several occasions. Navarro offers no basis for believing that 
the existence of a dismissed criminal charge involving the same victim would 
have even been admissible had he proceeded to trial. At best, Navarro may 
have been able to cross-examine M.M. regarding the nature of that charge, 
I.RE. 412, demonstrating that his claim is really based on the impeachment 
value of the evidence, which is not a valid Brady claim in light of Navarro's guilty 
plea. Ruiz, supra. 
Regardless, having failed to provide any evidence regarding the nature of 
the charge against Bueno or why it was dismissed, Navarro failed to satisfy his 
burden of proving materiality, especially in light of Navarro's repeated 
acknowledgments that he had sex with M.M., not only as part of his guilty plea 
(#34865 Tr., p.14, L.3 - p.16, L.11) but also to the presentence investigator, to 
whom he admitted guilt but claimed the intercourse was consensual (PSI, p.2), 
and in his Rule 35 motion where he reiterated that he had consensual sex with 
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the victim (#34865 R., pp.82-84). Certainly the knowledge that one committed 
the alleged offense is always a factor a reasonable defendant takes into 
consideration when deciding whether to plead guilty. 
Navarro, however, argues "[b]ecause [he] only derived a limited benefit 
from the plea agreement, he need show that the withheld evidence held less 
significance than in a case where the defendant derived significant benefit by 
way of reduced or dismissed charges and favorable sentencing 
recommendations." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Navarro is incorrect. What the 
Court of Appeals has said in this regard is that "any benefit derived by [a 
defendant] from the guilty plea is a significant factor inasmuch as a plea may be 
heavily motivated by reduced exposure to additional charges and criminal 
penalties." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. A petitioner is not 
relieved of his duty to prove materiality by claiming the benefit of his plea 
agreement was not significant. Beyond that, Navarro understates the benefit of 
the plea agreement. Because Navarro was only charged with a single offense, 
the state obviously could not dismiss any charges as part of the agreement. The 
state did, however, agree to "stand silent" with respect to a sentence 
recommendation and agreed to recommend Navarro's sentence run concurrent 
with the sentence he was serving in Texas even though the state could have 
requested a sentence up to life, I. C. § 18-1508, but did not despite the fact that 
Navarro had three other felony convictions and his offense against M.M. resulted 
in the pregnancy of a 13-year-old child. That Navarro has now decided the plea 
agreement was of "limited benefit" does not make it so. 
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Navarro failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was 
entitled to post-conviction relief on his Brady claim. 
D. Navarro Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel was 
Ineffective In Failing To Independently Discover The Prior 
Dismissed Case Against Bueno 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated: 
Surmounting Strick/ands high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules 
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
17 
"This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a 
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 
process." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011) 
(citations omitted). "When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's 
advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." kl at 621, 262 P.3d at 264 
(quotations and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of 
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
Navarro asserts: "Even if the state was not obliged to disclose that Mr. 
Navarro's alleged victim accused her father, trial counsel had a duty to discover 
that information, especially considering trial counsel's testimony that he had 
access to the father's old criminal case." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The district 
court correctly concluded Navarro failed to establish counsel was ineffective. 
When Navarro pied guilty to lewd conduct in 2007, he was represented by 
Scott Fouser who, at the time, had the Canyon County Public Defender contract. 
(#34865 Tr., pp.3-16; Tr., p.61, L.14 - p.62, L.3.) However, Fouser was not the 
public defender for Canyon County in 1995 or 1996 when the state charged 
Bueno, who was also represented by the public defender's office, nor did he 
work for the public defender at that time. (Tr., p.61, Ls.20-24, p.76, Ls.5-7; 
Exhibit 1 (Augmentation); Appendix A.) Nevertheless, when Fouser was 
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awarded the public defender contract in 1997, he received the files from the 
previous public defender, Van Bishop. (Tr., p.76, Ls.15-25.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Fouser testified he did not 
remember being aware that M.M. "had made similar accusations" against Bueno. 
(Tr., p.69, Ls.13-20.) Fouser also testified that, even assuming Bishop 
transferred a file from the Bueno case to him when he took over the public 
defender contract, there would be no reason for him to look for a file he did not 
know existed. (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.4.) Navarro claims the failure to do so 
was deficient, asserting counsel had an obligation to look for a file he did not 
know of simply because he supposedly had "access" to it. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) This assertion is not supported by the evidence or logic. 
That Fouser received files from Bishop does not mean those files included 
the one pertaining to the 1996 criminal case against Bueno. There was no 
evidence presented that Bishop actually maintained a file on the dismissed case 
against Bueno or that Fouser actually received such a file. Therefore, there is no 
evidence that Fouser actually had access to it - only the theoretical possibility 
that he could have. Even if Fouser had access, Navarro fails to explain why it 
would be deficient for an attorney to fail to look through all case files on the off-
chance that he might discover one that includes an allegation of lewd conduct by 
the same victim as the one identified in a pending criminal case. See Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) ("the duty to investigate does not force defense 
lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably 
diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further 
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investigation would be a waste"); Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 685 (ih Cir. 
1998), vacated in part, 162 F.3d 481 (ih Cir. 1999) ("reasonable investigation 
does not mandate a scorch-the-earth strategy, a requirement that would fail to 
consider the limited time and resources that defense lawyers have in preparing"); 
Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted) ( "While a lawyer is under a duty to make reasonable 
investigations, a lawyer may make a reasonable decision that particular 
investigations are unnecessary. To determine the reasonableness of a decision 
not to investigate, the court must apply a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel's judgments."). 
Even if the Sixth Amendment demanded such a potentially futile exercise 
by counsel, Navarro failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Fouser's 
failure to search all prior public defender files in his possession in an effort to 
uncover a case file unknown to him that may or may not be useful. As previously 
noted, Navarro failed to provide any evidence of the nature of the allegation 
against Bueno, why it was dismissed, or how it would have benefitted him had he 
gone to trial. Even Fouser would not concede, without more information, that it 
would have necessarily made a difference in how the case was resolved had he 
discovered the state filed and later dismissed a case against Bueno. (Tr., p.73, 
L.18 - p.74, L.22.) Navarro failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice. 
Compare People v. Mestas, 2013 WL 3809387 *6 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2013) ("Here, 
there is no showing of prejudice. He asserts that, if trial counsel had been more 
diligent, 'more information regarding the complaining witnesses['] past sexual 
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knowledge and conduct would have come before the jury." This is mere 
speculation. It assumes that, if trial counsel had done more investigation, she 
would have discovered facts that the trial court would have found admissible. It 
further assumes that such unknown facts would have been of a nature to 
undermine the jury's confidence in the victims' testimony. We will not assume 
there are such facts or that the trial court would have exercised its discretion to 
admit such unknown facts. Therefore, the defendant has failed to establish that 
he would have obtained a better result absent trial counsel's alleged 
deficiency."). 
Navarro's self-serving assertion that he would not have pied guilty had he 
known only that a case was filed against Bueno (without knowing anything else 
about it) is not rational under the circumstances. Padilla, supra. Navarro failed 
to establish counsel was ineffective as a result of his failure to discover the 
dismissed charge against Bueno. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Navarro's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 23rd day of August 2013. 
JESSIC 
Deputy orney General 
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